Center for Distance and Independent Study
Political Science 2520: Middle Eastern Politics

Commentary

In the Middle East, getting things done is very much about who you know. Individuals express their political demands through various group affiliations, both formal and informal. Family units, religious affiliations, political associations, brotherhoods, and guilds are all part of an intricate web of personal connections that make up the core of the sociopolitical system of the Middle East. Knit into this fabric are differing levels of power, wealth, and prestige that indicate a class structure within which power and authority are shaped.

Decision making is accomplished through the ability of informal groups to penetrate the more formal associations, such as political parties. Groups in the Middle East tend to be small in order to maximize trust and cooperation. Group gatherings are often secret, so as to strengthen members' position against potential rivals. 

Small, informal groups ensure that members will work together to achieve agreed-upon goals, as each individual's efforts are more likely to make a difference than is the case in larger groups. Theorists such as Mancur Olson contend that individual efforts in large groups are not rational, as these singular acts will usually make no perceptible difference in group goal attainment. On the other hand, members of small groups are much more susceptible to the power of peer pressure and persuasion among their cohorts. This is critical in the Middle East, where group formation tends to be fragmented and localized.

The dispersion of information in informal groups is crucial in the political decision-making process. The dominant characteristic of personalism contributes to the ability to spread information within this system. Individuals who have more personal contacts are better able to represent themselves and their group. Consequently, individuals will develop great skills of personal persuasion that often play a significant role in both personal and political decision making.

Another factor that is unique to informal groups is their fluidity in goal setting and, consequently, in membership. It is not unusual for such groups to change their goals as necessity dictates. Although this usually means that they will lose part of their membership, as some members will object to the new goals, the adhesive nature of informal groups ensures that former members can be readmitted whenever the need arises. Ironically, informal group politics promotes an underlying systemic stability.

The Centrality of the Kinship Group

As the above discussion indicates, informal groups are often fragmented, fleeting entities. How, then, do they promote systemic stability? The answer lies in the core of the informal group setting in the Middle East, that of the family, or kinship group. The kinship group is considered to be the anchor upon which all of the other informal groups are based in the social structure. It is, naturally, more rigid than most of the other groups that spring from it.

Marriage patterns in this setting are critical, as they determine in what direction the family will move. In the Middle East, the preferred pattern continues to be the endogamous, paternal first-cousin marriage. It has significant political implications, as it affords family heads the critical support of their brothers and their brothers' sons. In this manner, it has contributed greatly to systemic stability, as important blood ties were strengthened and the family unit constantly expanded. This pattern can be traced back to the age of the Prophet Muhammad, when arranged marriages were undertaken to resolve conflicts between different tribal factions.

The political capabilities of strong kinship groups are legion. Family members are very supportive of each other's attempts to improve their power and authority positions in society. It is not unusual to find a family represented in rival political factions or parties. In fact, Bill and Springborg point out that one of the major purposes of spreading family members across different groups is the construction and maintenance of communication channels among these groups, whether they be rivals or allies. For instance, family members in factions maintain close contact with their counterparts in parliaments. Thus, decisions in both settings are mutually influential.

The Power of Women in Middle Eastern Society

Often overlooked within the kinship group is the powerful role that women play through their positions as wife and mother. Women in the Middle East have often been referred to as the "matchmakers and peacemakers" (Bill and Springborg, page 79). They have also been the revolutionaries, exerting as much, if not more, impact on independence movements in the early twentieth century as did their male counterparts. Examples abound of these cases. For instance, women played a critical role in the Iranian constitutional movement from 1905 to 1911. They organized themselves into informal groups and took to the streets to expound their political ideals. In the Algerian war of independence, women were an important part of the resistance, doing everything from hiding fugitives to participating in more militant forms of action. A third example lies in the contemporary realm, as young, female Palestinian fedayeen have taken on the role of suicide bomber in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle.

Middle Eastern women are enjoying some limited expansion in their legal rights, albeit slowly. Women can be found in national parliaments and government bureaucracies. In 2003, an Iranian woman won the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in fighting for the rights of women in Iran. However, women have not substituted these new roles for their traditional influence in the kinship group, where they continue to operate most effectively.

Class Structure

It is important to note that usually only individuals in the middle and upper classes enjoy the luxury of belonging to informal groups that actually influence the national polity. The majority of the people in any Arab society reside in the lower echelon of the class structure. As such, they seldom, if ever, represent an influential voice in national decision making. However, material resources are usually not sufficient by themselves to allow individuals to attain their goals. Just as important are personal contacts, social manipulation, saintly ancestry, familial solidarity, political maneuvering, and other similar means by which Middle Easterners exert power and influence in society. 

Bill and Springborg define several dimensions of power that have been influential in shaping class structure in the Middle East. Among these are informational exchanges that involve the dispensing and withholding of valuable information; decisional situations in which one person controls the decision-making environment; debt-inflicting relationships; and kinship patterns. It is within these power dimensions that individuals find their place in society. 

The Middle Eastern class system consists of a number of hierarchies that have been described in various ways by various theorists. Bill and Springborg divide these hierarchies into one upper class, three middle classes, and three lower classes. The upper class comprises the ruling elite, while the three middle classes consist of the bureaucratic, the bourgeois, and the cleric groupings. The bulk of Middle Eastern society falls into the three lower classes, comprising workers, peasants, and nomads.

The upper class is traditionally the ruling class and includes not only the ruling family, but also military leaders, large native landlords, highest-level bureaucrats, the top leadership of the religious Ulema, tribal chieftains and khans, and the wealthiest merchants and business entrepreneurs. Within this class, family ties and intermarriage patterns become crucial in consolidating the ruling family's hold on power.

The bureaucratic middle class remains the most powerful of the three traditional middle classes and is closest to the ruling class. Its membership is composed of government employees who staff the administrative system. Most members of this class serve ruling-class interests, as proximity to the leadership always holds the possibility of movement into upper-class ranks.

Located between the bureaucratic and cleric classes is the bourgeois element, consisting of middle-class businessmen, merchants, and traders. The center of activity for this class is the bazaar, or suq. Because members of this group are deeply involved in commercial activities, any ruler-inspired policies that threaten their goals have met with stiff opposition when this class acts in unison. Acting in unison has coalesced into such entities as guilds and brotherhoods, both of which usually possess ideological components. This last aspect has served as a link between the bourgeoisie and the Islamic clerics and working class.

The third traditional middle class is the cleric. Because Islam represents a way of life involving not only religious but also political, economic, social, educational, and psychological dimensions, this particular class can be substantially influential in the decision-making realm. Not only do clerics possess an important religio-psychological influence over practicing Muslims; they also exert power through their control of the educational system. Most of their constituency can be found in the lower classes.

Most members of the lower class are peasants. Of the three lower classes, the peasants have the least power and are quite often exploited by those above them in the class structure. The situation of the nomadic lower class is only slightly better than that of the peasants, given the former's modicum of natural freedom and their occasional importance as military forces.

The traditional working class is the highest of the three lower classes in terms of potential strength and influence. It includes such groups as servants, manual laborers, craftsmen, and artisans. They gather their influence through their membership in guilds and brotherhoods, thus gaining them organizational protection.

As the forces of modernization have progressed, class membership within these groups has been modified as well. Land-reform programs, along with an increasing emphasis on industrialization, have caused the power bases of the ruling class to shift. Land ownership as a power credential has been replaced by industrial investment, such as banking, contracting, and export-import trade. In addition, the traditional middle classes have been expanding in size, especially the bourgeoisie. Nomadic tribes are also slowly being forced to settle, blending in with the peasantry. The working class seems especially problematic, as the growth of shantytowns along the edges of major metropolises indicates a growing unemployed, restive segment of the population.

Bill and Springborg suggest that two new classes have appeared as a result of the growth of modernization and industrialization in the Middle East: an industrial lower working class and a professional middle class. The major difference between the industrial working class and its traditional counterpart is that this new working class is located in large cities and is also becoming more socially aware of inequities. However, it has not realized its potential as a significant sociopolitical force to the same extent as the new professional middle class.

The professional middle class has also appeared as a result of the modernization process. Its membership consists of those who have benefited from a modern higher education.  The major difference between this middle class and its traditional counterparts is that it attempts to advance itself through professional skills rather than through personal connections and wealth, which its members usually do not possess. These are the white-collar technocrats. They are becoming increasingly influential due to their educational background, as modernization continues to call for more engineers, physicians, teachers, and other occupations that require higher education. As Bill and Springborg point out, continued economic and industrial development guarantees the growth of this new middle class.

The professional middle class has the potential to significantly change the overall class structure in Middle Eastern society. It already represents a threat to the traditional sociopolitical system. Its members constantly criticize the old network of personalism and favoritism by which the system has functioned. Because they regard such facets as a threat to their own ability to move up the class ranks based on professional merit, they are among the loudest in demanding political development. However, this new middle class suffers from its own internal divisions and tensions, as well as from internal elements that are most prone to co-optation by the ruling class. Until it can overcome these problems, it will not be able to realize its goal of changing class alignments. 

Islamic Political Development

One cannot understand the concept of group development in the Middle East without also examining the impact that Islamic political development has had on it.  Islam is a way of life that involves political, economic, social, educational, religious, and psychological dimensions.  Despite all of the differences that separate various Middle Eastern leaders, a number of similarities can be traced all the way back to the days when the Prophet Muhammad gave the Arab world the Islamic religion.

The Prophet Muhammad was born in 570 CE, when social and political life was dominated by the often violent interactions of various clans and tribes, most of whom were pagans.  These relationships were influenced by an intense commercial rivalry, as nomads moved into the world of commerce and trade. 

Muhammad preached the Judeo-Christian prophetic traditions, emphasizing belief in one God and the virtues of generosity, charity, and compassion. By emphasizing such values as charity and generosity, he represented a threat to the established political and economic order. The wealthier residents of the Meccan community, where he began his work, took exception to his teachings. The Meccan elites had accumulated great wealth by virtue of their role as custodians of the pagan shrines that existed in Arabia at the time. In addition, Muhammad's attack on the existing order, and his offer of his own community as an alternative, struck at the heart of existing political relationships.

Yet, despite the increasing threats to his well-being, Muhammad managed to succeed in his Meccan mission, due in great part to two tactics. First was his willingness to be discreet in his activities. He used a close, inner circle of family and friends to spread his message, focusing on those most likely to convert. Second was his use of clan politics. Tribal relations in the sixth and seventh centuries were characterized by an overwhelming focus on self-preservation, which meant that individual clan members had to be protected from all external threats. In fact, politics in the Middle East is still very much characterized by clan self-preservation. Perhaps one of the most timely examples is that of the el-Takriti clan of Iraq, to which former President Saddam Hussein belonged. During the 2003 Iraq War, U.S. forces were often frustrated by the fierce resistance that they met from family members who fought to protect Hussein's whereabouts.  In the early seventh century, Muhammad's clan was headed by his uncle Abu Talib, who provided him with similar protection from his opponents. 

Muhammad's fortunes turned briefly after the death of his uncle and his wife Khadija (who had brought great personal wealth and influence to her marriage to the Prophet). As a result of these two losses, Muhammad was forced to flee Mecca to Medina in 622, in a journey that became known as the hijra.  He was welcomed in Medina, which was riddled with interclan strife. Indeed, it could be argued that it was here that Muhammad really began to contribute to Islamic political development. 

Medinans strongly disliked the wealthier Meccans. The Prophet recognized that bringing an end to the intertribal rivalries in Medina could strengthen his position in opposing Meccan hegemony. The relationship was reciprocated, as Medinans sensed in Muhammad a leader who could, through reconciliation, bring an end to the factionalism that was dividing their city. Consequently, parochial clan politics began to be replaced with an emphasis on the umma, or community, which remains a politically significant term in the Islamic world today.

Muhammad initiated a series of successful military campaigns that served to bind together individuals of different clans in a common cause. Indeed, many contemporary Middle Eastern leaders are renowned for their military prowess and their ability to bind people together. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan serve as two such examples.

The Prophet also had another tool at his disposal with which to resolve conflict.  A critical component of Islamic political development credited to Muhammad is intermarriage between clans.  Intermarriage became a tool of consolidation under his leadership.  Muhammad himself married at least nine times, and many theologians and social scientists alike contend that all of these unions were political in nature.   Marriage continues to be used today in the Middle East as a way of not only strengthening and broadening familial ties, but also of neutralizing political tensions.

Muhammad also stressed the willingness to compromise. One of the best examples of this was the Treaty of Hudaybiya, which brought an end to his military campaign against the Meccans. After twenty years of fighting, Muhammad returned victorious to Mecca.

As Bill and Springborg point out, what is noteworthy of this event is that it took place in an atmosphere inundated with feuding. Thus, the Prophet recognized the need to unite the divided and fragmented groups of his society. This remains a fundamental issue in the region today, just as it was in the seventh century. Thus, political flexibility and the ability to compromise are essential characteristics of a successful Middle Eastern leader.

The Middle Eastern sociopolitical system continues to be characterized by patrimonialism, a system that represents a routinized form of patriarchy. The emphasis in this system is on the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Listed below are six traits that are important to leaders within such a system.

Six Traits of Leadership Valued within a Patrimonial System

1. The influence of personalism grew out of tribal politics, in which informal organization and personal relationships prevail in decision making. Personalism means that the leader gathers as much information as possible on others in the political network. The patrimonial link is enhanced by the tradition of rulers describing their societies as large families, with the rulers taking the role of "father."
2. Proximity is another characteristic of the patrimonial system of the Middle East. Because of the atmosphere of closely centralized, personal, informal decision making that abounds, those individuals who are closest in physical proximity to the leader tend to have more power. Marital ties are an important consideration in issues of proximity.
3. Informality is the third leadership characteristic. Formal institutions such as legislatures are not particularly effective in the Middle East, because much decision making results from behind-the-scenes planning.  The uncertainty that often results from this pattern has also given rise to the importance of rumors in Islamic political development. The wise leader is one who will take rumors seriously.
4. Balanced conflict plays a significant role in the ruler's hold on power. The patrimonial leader will play one side against the other ("divide and rule"), thus reinforcing systemic stability.  Effective leaders will splinter potential opposition forces, while at the same time taking on the role of supreme mediator.  Saddam Hussein's ability to play off his many intelligence agencies against one another stands as a good example of the effectiveness of the balanced conflict tactic.
5. Military prowess, as mentionned earlier, is another valued leadership trait in patrimonial society. This characteristic is based on tribal traditions, where leadership in battle was seen as a key aspect of one's ability to be an effective ruler. The development of a strong, effective military at the personal disposal of the leader is a key component of this trait.
6. Finally, but certainly not least important, is the utilization of religious rationalization as a tool of effective leadership. In the Middle East, Islam provides the leader with a rationale for his policies. This is based on the tradition of emanation, an Islamic tradition wherein the ruler treats his subjects as an extension of himself. In turn, these subjects deny their own separate identity in exchange for their sovereign's guarantee of security.

Within the patrimonial society of the Middle East, there are several opportunities for advancement within the political system: through the military, the bureaucracy, or the religious establishment. Although recruitment considerations are based upon such premises as professional skill, talent, and merit, recruitment is controlled from the center of the system (that is, from the leader himself). For instance, individuals who are already national political leaders head political parties, where such entities exist in the region.  The "patrimonial head" retains strict control over the party leadership, often awarding the position to trusted advisors or ministers. Indeed, Bill and Springborg point out that national legislatures often serve as the "political dumping grounds" for those who have fallen out of favor with the ruler, thus illustrating the weakness of such institutions in the Middle East (page 129).